Honestly, I find almost everyone who reads the Manifesto and nothing else does not understand it at all. It relies on a lot of complicated ideas which it doesn’t go into detail on, and the popular English translation also has misleading translation errors. People who read it end up filling in the gaps with preconceptions that they have been primed to interpret it as from liberal society, and thus end up interpreting it in a silly way that is not how it was intended at all.

It is better to start with lengthier, more in-depth works that try to actually build out their worldview, like Critique of the German Ideology, The Poverty of Philosophy, and Anti-Durhing.

I do think higher-stage communism in one country is questionable, but this was a very late opinion of Stalin and not something from any of his earlier works, so it’s not really relevant to what most people mean by Marxism-Leninism, which is centered upon what he wrote in Foundations of Leninism. Marxism-Leninism is not some pro-Stalin cult (which may be surprising to hear if a Trotskyist is reading this, as they are a pro-Trotsky cult), so it doesn’t imply a belief in everything Stalin ever wrote. I’m sure if you asked the majority of Marxist-Leninists if the higher-stage of communism is possible in one country, they’d say no.

We can cherry-pick Stalin all we want to find things that people may disagree on, but that doesn’t establish that there are groups of people who going “parroting things that clash with Marx believed in” unless you can also demonstrate that this opinion is something widely held. I’ve never seen evidence of it being so. Marxism is also not a religion anyways, we shouldn’t be focused on strict adherence to “what Marx believed in.” Marx’s intention was to create a scientific method of analysis for socioeconomic development. Even in cases where you can find a group of Marxists who clearly disagree with something Marx held, that in and of itself doesn’t matter; what matters is the reasons they disagree with it, and whether or not their new analysis makes sense.

Marx’s specific model is not fully explanatory, no, I would agree with that. But I don’t get why you’re painting this as an attack on dialectical materialism, because dialectical materialism is not a model of history. If you supplemented Marx’s model, improved upon it and added more detail, this would still be within the framework of dialectical materialism, or else it’s not worth taking seriously. You would still need to stick to a material analysis, and it’s impossible to speak on things without categorizing them, so you would still need to introduce labels for categories to talk about, i.e. “classes,” and those would still need to be rooted in material reality.

I have seen many analyses that were fairly interesting that were not explicit to Marx. For example, I recall one author argued that people who engage largely in domestic work, such as stay-at-home wives, don’t entirely have the same relations to production as those who work under an employer, and so they should be treated as their own class, meaning the differences in their labor and their interests deserve their own analysis, and they further argued that the “domestic economy” in general deserves much more study, since most Marxian texts only tend to focus on the wage labor economy, and older ones with the peasant economy, part of this being due to the fact that domestic labor isn’t paid and therefore tends to not be tracked.

Maybe you agree with it, maybe you don’t, but I did think it was interesting thing to consider. They were arguing precisely what you siad: in factor of “extra complications and nuances” rather than just ignoring domestic work or lumping domestic laborers into the same category as wage laborers and thus treating them as “the same,” which misses the nuance between them. But, they weren’t just simply arguing for extra complications a nuances for their own sake, but arguing for it to improve upon and construct a more detailed material analysis.

That is just one example I recall prominently from the top of my head, but it’s meant to illustrate a simple point. I will take your “extra complications and nuances” as something worthy of consideration if, and only if, it is still following a dialectical materialist analysis. There are tons of authors, like Bernardo Kastrup, who tries to introduce “extra complications and nuances” into physics, but his complications are all idealist mumbo jumbo incoherent voodoo nonsense, so he’s not worth taking seriously.

Additions to physics, as well as additions to historical materialist analysis, should not be idealist nonsense and should still be compatible with dialectical materialism in nature or they are not worth considering.

I believe ECC is also targetable by quantum computers in theory. Post-quantum cryptography is lattice-based ciphers like Kyber.

I’d disagree about the blockchain. It doesn’t actually provide anything useful and massively wastes resources, because it requires a ton of energy doing useless calculations for a fake token that you just gamble with on the internet. Countries that ban it are immediately placed in an economic advantage because they free up tons of resources to actually go into producing real physical things and not meme coins, which is a big reason why China has largely banned Bitcoin, viewing it as a major burden on their energy infrastructure while contributing nothing real to the economy.

There are a lot of libertarian weirdos in tech who try to push certain technologies solely for ideological reasons. They will tell you how ideological superior the blockchain is for decentralizing things and thus not making you dependent on Uncle Sam. But they don’t actually provide any utility to that other than ideology.

The only non-ideological explanation I have ever received is that the blockchain is good because it makes it easier to break the law if the law is unjust. If for example you want to pay someone for something that is wrongfully made illegal to begin with, you can pay them in Bitcoin and get away with it easier.

That to me, however, is a bit of a bizarre argument. Saying that X should be legal because X can be used to break the law makes little coherent sense. Obviously, the law at that point is the problem and is what should be changed. If you have the power to influence what is legal (and thus to actually act upon the question of whether or not something should be legal), then obviously we should choose to get rid of the unjust law, not to legalize Bitcoin. If we do not have the power to influence what is legal, then the conversation is moot anyways.

NFTs were even worse, because nobody has ever made a non-ideological argument for NFTs. They are always justified based on some weird ideological belief about the sanctity of some nebulous “private property” registered on the blockchain. Laughably, blockchain technologies do not have the storage capacity to practically hold entire images, so they just held links to the images, and so many now lead to nowhere because the original servers they were registered with are down.

People often hate me for the fact that I often defend the utility and potential utility of AI and quantum technologies (even if I do agree that companies hype it and push out slop, that does not prove the technologies themselves are entirely a scam). But I have always been a critic of blockchain and the “metaverse,” because those were hypecycles which nobody could actually give me a single coherent explanation of how these things might improve human society at all in any material way.

…which is something I actually consider. It does indeed actually bother me that very few companies have actually adopted post-quantum cryptography yet. What is even the point of my VPN, for example, if there is a potential that everything is cracked 40 years down the line? NIST has already basically approved the standards. It should be an option for sensitive things, like anything to do with banking, data storage, and VPN.

Object permanence is technically an axiom. The idea that things exist even when we aren’t observing them.

If things do not exist exist when you’re not looking at them, well, you are a thing, and so you do not exist when I am not looking at you. Denying object permanence inevitably collapses into solipsism.

There’s also a problem with terms, particularly related to quantum mechanics. It uses the term observer. To a layman, that’s a person watching. To a scientist its any collection of atoms/fundamental particles that can cause the quantum waveform to collapse.

This is patently false. Observer in quantum mechanics absolutely just refers to an experimenter watching. What you are repeating is a common myth and does not accurately reflect the dominant views among physicists in academia.

What you are talking about is a physical collapse theory. A physical collapse theory is impossible to be perfectly reconciled with the mathematics of quantum mechanics. You can reconcile it in a limiting case, and potentially all cases we can actually practical observe, but not in all possible conceivable cases, due to physical collapse breaking the linearity of the theory.

Physical collapse theories are thus not even quantum mechanics but brand new speculative physical models. Some physicists have proposed such models, like GRW theory or the Diosi-Penrose model, but these are alternative speculative models which lack broad support.

The dominant paradigm is the Copenhagen interpretation. The Copenhagen interpretation rejects that the collapse is a physical event that happens at all, but treats it as a subjective event. The collapse occurs in the mathematics, not in physical reality, as a means of the observer book-keeping the information they have on the system.

The Copenhagen interpretation absolutely does not posit that observation is “any collection of atoms/fundamental particles that can cause the quantum waveform to collapse,” as this necessarily leads to the following question, “What exactly qualifies some physical systems to play the role of ‘measurer’? Was the wavefunction of the world waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer, for some better qualified system…with a PhD?”

The way you frame it naturally leads one to ask what rigorous mathematical definition actually qualifies a collection of atoms/fundamental particles to be able to cause the quantum waveform to (physically) collapse, but quantum theory alone does not tell you that, so you would have to go beyond it and introduce a new model. Copenhagen does not do that. It does not posit what you are claiming at all.

quantum mechanics being the oddball

Quantum mechanics is not an oddball at all. In any statistical theory, you track only the observer’s knowledge of the state of the system, and thus do not actually include its definite state in the mathematics. But nobody interprets that to mean its definite state does not still exist in the real world, except in the case for quantum mechanics, when people insist we should suddenly do a 180 u-turn and interpret the statistics entirely differently.

The physicist Dmitry Blokhintsev published a paper back in the 1950s which already pointed this out, that the confusion around quantum mechanics all stems from insisting upon treating it as a non-statistical theory. Statistics deal with the observer’s subjective knowledge, and so naturally statistical states vary based on an observer’s subjective knowledge. If you insist that the statistical state is a physical state (and thus not “statistical” at all), then you end up with a picture whereby objective reality can change depending upon an observer’s subjective knowledge, which leads entirely to a breakdown of any coherent notion of objective reality, as demonstrated in Eugene Wigner’s famous “friend” paradox.

The reality is that no physicist has ever published a paper in the peer-reviewed literature actually establishing that quantum mechanics demands you believe that the quantum state is a physical state. This is just a very very popular belief. We should not treat the “academic consensus” as just “what most physicists happen to believe.” If we are living in a country that is mostly Christian, one might find most physicists identify as Christian, but that would not make Christianity the “academic concensus.”

The “academic consensus” should be established through a meta-analysis of the preponderance of findings in actual peer-reviewed, academic journals. Not just what physicists personally believe, but what they have actually published. Yet, no physicist has ever published a paper establishing this belief, despite its popularity.

Only one major paper I’m aware of even attempted to do so, that being the famous “PBR theorem.” But if you read that paper, even the paper itself acknowledges it is not definitive, because their proof depends upon you believing that the way the particle responds to an interaction only depends upon its present state, a property called Markovianity. This assumption is necessary because their proof requires that the particles are prepared independently in the past then come together to interact in the present, with no information stored regarding their preparation existing in the present, and thus their behavior must be independent of their preparation. But if the outcome of the interaction has dependence upon the past, then you can trivially explain the same results, because the information would not need to exist in the present to influence the outcome of the present interaction.

Indeed, the physicist Jacob Barandes mathematically proved that quantum mechanics is mathematically equivalent to a statistical theory that is non-Markovian, Hence, the “non-classicality” of quantum mechanics can be interpreted as not arising from particles existing in “multiple places at once,” as if the quantum state is a physical state, but merely that when particles interact, the outcome of the interaction simply takes into account, on the level of the nomology, their statistical states into the past.

There is no definitive reason to take the quantum state as a physical state, and so there is no conflict or confusion between quantum theory and object permanence. It is just a very very popular belief among physicists. Physics is not entirely math and empirical evidence. It is also ideology.

This was something pointed out heavily by the physicist John Bell. In his paper “On the Impossible Pilot Wave,” he points out that the physicist David Bohm had already proposed a model mathematically equivalent to standard quantum mechanics and made all the same predictions, yet did not have these bizarre features, and so belief in those bizarre features is ultimately an ideological choice and not demanded by the empirical evidence or the mathematical model.

Indeed, Bell also published a paper “How to Teach Special Relativity” where he points out that the mathematics and empirical predictions of special relativity is actually perfectly compatible with a universe with absolute space and time, where the relativity of measurements of rods and clocks is an emergent and not fundamental feature, and so belief that space and time are really relative is ultimately an ideological position and not demanded by the mathematics or empirical evidence.

Too many physicists tend to struggle to separate the ideology from the mathematics and empirical evidence, and constantly conflate the first with the latter two, as if you must believe in their particular ideological viewpoint or else you’re a crazy person, a “crackpot,” who is denying the mathematics and empirical evidence. But it just does not logically follow. Nothing in the linear algebra of quantum mechanics demands you actually believe particles exist in multiple states at once. It is a perfectly consistent position to believe that particles always have a definite state, while also believing that the mathematical body of quantum mechanics is completely accurate, because nothing in the mathematics itself demands you take on a particular ideological position.

That is a choice you make outside of the mathematics. It is a particular ideological choice, imposed on top of the mathematics of quantum mechanics, which leads to a conflict with object permanence. It is not the mathematics of quantum mechanics itself which conflicts with it at all.

[I]n 1952 I saw the impossible done. It was in papers by David Bohm. Bohm showed explicitly how[…]the subjectivity of the orthodox version, the necessary reference to the “observer,” could be eliminated. Moreover, the essential idea was one that had been advanced already by de Broglie (in 1927, in his “pilot wave” picture. But why then had Born not told me of this “pilot wave?” If only to point out what was wrong with it? Why did von Neumann not consider it? More extraordinarily, why did people go on producing “impossibility”proofs, after 1952, and as recently as 1978? When even Pauli, Rosenfeld, and Heisenberg, could produce no more devastating criticism of Bohm’s version than to brand it as “metaphysical” and “ideological?” Why is the pilot wave picture ignored in text books? Should it not be taught, not as the only way, but as an antidote to the prevailing complacency? To show that vagueness, subjectivity, and indeterminism, are not forced on us by experimental facts, but by deliberate theoretical choice?

— John Bell

I’m going to reiterate my original claim because much of your comment misses the point. In the comment above I argued that quantum theory has interesting philosophical implications.

You didn’t read my original comment, then, since the whole point in my reply was to demonstrate that QM does not change the situation at all when it comes to the metaphysics, i.e. it does not have philosophical implications which classical mechanics did not have.

So when you assert materialism this is intellectual honesty, but when someone argues for an anti-materalist stance, based on observable evidence as strange as quantum entanglement (which you are quick to explain away) this is just personal metaphysics?

I don’t know if your reading comprehension really is that poor or you are just intentionally misinterpreting what I stated.

No, I did not claim that materialism is being “intellectually honest” here, I claimed that the ones being intellectually honest are the ones who do not pretend like quantum mechanics supports their metaphysics, which includes materialists, at least not any more than classical physics did.

Occam’s razor doesn’t allow us to flippantly dismiss positions we deem unintuitive.

Sure, but Sagan’s razor does, if you present your mystical claims without a shred of evidence.

Again, you’re familiar with the physics side but are incapable of considering alternate philosophical points of view.

You are incapable of being intellectually honest and want to desperately pretend that quantum physics proves idealism. I at least have the intellectual honesty to not pretend quantum mechanics is relevant to such questions of metaphysics.

Gatekeeping? If you want to believe in crackpot mysticism, be my guest. Just don’t expect me to believe it or not to criticize you for it if you attempt to spread those crank views on a public forum.

Furthermore, Bell-type experiments, which are a part of the broader quantum theory, display quantum entanglement such that measuring one half of the experiment decides the outcome of the other.

That is just non-locality. It also doesn’t “decide the outcome” of the other. It is more complicated than that. Bell’s theorem is about a locally stochastic theory having to obey Reichenbachian factorization, which is the idea that a joint probability distribution between two objects should be factorizable if you condition on a common cause in their backwards light cone where they locally interacted. If you assume this, it places certain statistical bounds on what results you can expect, which is broken in practice.

If you interpret quantum mechanics as a stochastic theory without altering its mathematics, then the outcomes are just random so nothing determines them by definition, but what one observer does in their lab does affect the kind of statistical correlations they would expect to find with another person’s lab if they later compare results. In a deterministic model that does add something, like Bohmian mechanics, this model is also contextual, so the deterministic trajectories depend upon the full experimental context. Ultimately, the particle’s trajectory is still ultimately determined by its initial state, but the observer changing the configuration of the measurement devices while the particle is mid-flight does alter the physical context of the experiment and thus can alter those trajectories.

To be clear, Bernard does not promote skepticism about reality or its objectivity. But he argues convincingly that the evidence is inconsistent with materialism.

If you presented him accurately then he undeniably does. You cannot claim X then turn around saying you’re not claiming X. If there are no facts about things until you look at them then there is no objectivity. That is literally solipsism.

Whether you agree with Bernard is immaterial (pun intended). The larger point here is that reasonable people can disagree with materialism giving the probabilistic, relational, and epistemologically problematic nature of subatomic particles.

I don’t see what is non-materialistic about statistics. One of the most famous and influential materialists in history, Friedrich Engels, heavily criticized causality in his writings, viewing cause-and-effect as an abstraction such that the same system could be described in a different context where what is considered the cause and what is considered the effect swap places. The physicist Dmitry Blokhintsev, the man who invented the concept of the graviton, was personally inspired by Engels’ writings and even cited this in a paper he wrote criticizing the Copenhagenists for thinking lack of “Laplacian determinism” as he called it implies a contradiction with materialism, saying that materialist of his school had already rejected Laplacian determinism since the 1800s.

Again, the arguments you’re making have nothing to do with quantum mechanics at all. If they have literally no relevance to quantum mechanics, then it makes no sense to try and use quantum mechanics as an argument in your favor. One can also imagine existing in a universe where the laws of physics are classical without quantum mechanics at all, but systems still undergo fundamentally random perturbations. These are classical perturbations which cannot violate Bell inequalities, but would still disallow you from tracking the definite states of particles and they could only be tracked with a vector in configuration space that is a linear combination of basis states.

If one wants to argue that randomness somehow contradicts with materialism, then the same argument could be made in that universe, and so the argument must have nothing to do with quantum mechanics.

These insights obviously conflict with our understanding of materialism! We cannot simply presume the truth of materialism because we find it more intuitive. At best, scientists can justify their assumption of materialism on practical grounds.

Sagan’s razor. “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” “Intuitive” refers to things which are blatantly obvious and self-evident and are supported by all of our observations. To deny it thus requires a much greater burden of evidence. If you want to claim everything we perceive is a lie, that we all live inside of a grand illusion and reality actually works fundamentally differently than to what we perceive, then this is, indeed, quite an extraordinary claim, and I am simply going to dismiss it unless you can provide extraordinary evidence for it.

Yet, no extraordinary evidence is ever presented. Only vague loose philosophical arguments. That is just not convincing to me. The reality is that we already know you can fit the predictions of special relativity and quantum mechanics to simple theories point particles moving deterministically in 3D space with well-defined values at all times evolving in an absolute space and time. The point is, again, not that we should necessarily believe such a model, but the fact we know such models can be constructed disproves any claim that we cannot interpret quantum mechanics as a realist theory. If you don’t add anything to it, you have to interpret it as a stochastic theory, but I have no issue with statistics. My issue only arises when people claim a system described by a statistical distribution has “no fact” about it in the real world.

That is just mysticism not backed by anything.

I take a very “conservative” approach to philosophy. If you are going to introduce some brand new world-shattering “paradigm shift” metaphysics, then I am going to be your biggest skeptic. I will want you to demonstrate that this is a necessity, either a logical or empirical necessity, such that all more trivial ways to conceive of the world have been exhausted.

Our belief in objective reality and object permanence isn’t just something we farted out one day for fun because we have an “unreasonable bias.” People believe these things because they fit our day-to-day self-evident empirical observations and do a great job to make sense of things. If you are going to throw them out, you therefore better have a damned good reason, rather than just complaining that we’re being “biased” based on our “intuition.”

That’s just a cop-out.

2/2

You may have good arguments for one camp within this discussion (e.g., sophisticated materialism) but to dismiss the philosophical implications outright prima facie indicates either a lack of familiarity with the philosophy of physics or perhaps a dismissal of metaphysics as a fruitful enterprise.

No, it reflects something called intellectual honesty. It is always possible for two different groups of people, given the same predictive body of mathematics, to draw different metaphysical conclusions from them. The idea that the mathematics necessitate someone’s particular metaphysics is just intellectual dishonesty pushed by people with bizarre views who can’t defend them on any other grounds other than to dishonestly pretend that the mathematics somehow proves them.

Call this “strong objectivity”. In contrast, Bernard d’Espagnat, theoretical physicist and philosopher of science, argues against materialism on the grounds that standard quantum mechanics is only “weakly objective”. (See his book, “On Physics and Philosophy”.) Although our observations are intersubjectively valid, quantum mechanics is predictive rather than descriptive: it does not describe the world as consisting of mind-independent entities that have determinate properties before they are observed/measured.

This is blatantly obviously his personal metaphysical interpretation which is in no way necessitated from the mathematics. I can just look at the exact same body of mathematics and interpret it as describing an objective but stochastic world. Even in a purely classical world, but one which evolves through random perturbations, we would find that we cannot track the definite states of objects at a given time. We could thus only track an evolving probability distribution. But it is understood, typically, that when it comes to probability, that there is an underlying configuration of the system in the real world, but we just do not know which one it is.

To deny this is to deny object permanence. These properties are not invisible, they are directly observable. We just happen to not be observing them in the moment, but they still possess observable properties and thus are observable under a counterfactually conceived circumstance. This is the basis of object permanence, that we don’t reject the existence of observable things just because we are not observing them in the precise moment, as long as they can be observed under a counterfactual.

There is no fact of the matter concerning the state of the system before we measure it.

This is to devolve into crackpot solipsism. Humans are made out of particles. If particles have no fact of the matter about them until you look, then other humans also have no fact about them either before you look. This was Schrodinger’s point about his “cat” thought experiment. He was trying to point out that your beliefs about fundamental particles cannot be confined to fundamental particles, that they necessarily also imply things about macroscopic objects as well, like cats, or other people.

There is, again, literally nothing in the theory that forces you to accept this premise. The delusion goes back to John von Neumann who was a brilliant mathematician but also a crackpot who originated the “consciousness causes collapse” interpretation of quantum mechanics and was a major advocate for starting a WW3 nuclear holocaust. In one of his books on the mathematics of quantum mechanics, he tries to offer a mathematical “proof” that objective reality doesn’t exist, by showing that, if quantum mechanics is just a stochastic theory, then it should follow certain statistical laws, and shows that it violates those laws.

However, John Bell would later debunk von Neumann’s “proof” in his own response paper, published at the same time he published his famous theorem. Since von Neumann was a brilliant mathematician, there were no mathematical flaws in his “proof,” and so it had a major impact and caused many physicists to start agreeing with von Neumann’s mysticism. But Bell pointed out that the issue is not in the mathematics, but the premises. von Neumann’s assumptions about statistics are not just rules underlying pure statistics, but also include physical assumptions as well, specifically he adopted an assumption of additivity which only makes sense if the underlying physics are classical. If the underlying physics are not classical, then there is no reason for such an assumption to hold.

All von Neumann really proved was that the underlying statistical dynamics cannot be governed by classical physics. This is why Bell also published his other paper in the same year published his paper in response to the EPR paper as well, showing that Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen’s beliefs that the underlying physics can be reduced to a classical stochastic theory are false. These physicists with crackpot beliefs love to present a false dichotomy where the only two possibilities are (1) quantum mechanics is a classically stochastic theory or (2) objective reality doesn’t exist. What Bell was trying to argue was that quantum mechanics is a non-classically stochastic theory.

What is “non-classical” about it is debatable, but the most trivial answer which was the one Bell identified is that it is simply not a local theory. In the modern day literature, this non-locality is sometimes more accurately referred to as contextuality. The stochastic dynamics simply depend upon the full experimental context. For example, consider the Elitzur-Vaidman experiment: https://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9305002

This experiment proves that the mere presence or absence of a barrier alters the statistical behavior of a photon which never interacts with the barrier, because the photon’s stochastic evolution depends upon the entire experimental context, not just what it directly interacts with at the moment. This is why von Neumann’s additivity assumption does not hold. It assumes that if we only consider the photon that passed through path A while B is blocked, and path B while A is blocked, then the statistics of the photons passing through A or B when neither is blocked should just be Pr(A)+Pr(B). But, as shown from the Elitzur-Vaidman setup, this is obviously not the case, because the photon, even in the individual case, is influenced by the presence or absence of a barrier it does not interact with, so even if a photon takes path A, if there is no barrier on path B, it can influence its statistical behavior differently than if a barrier were present. You therefore cannot meaningfully add together Pr(A_barrier)+Pr(B_barrier) and expect it to yield Pr(A_nobarrier)+Pr(B_nobarrier). They are not the same.

But, despite von Neumann’s proof being debunked by Bell, these same crackpots in physics academia took Bell’s theorem and started to run around claiming Bell’s new theorem is proof objective reality doesn’t exist, even though Bell never claimed that. Bell was literally a major proponent of realist models, publishing a paper trying to develop Bohm’s pilot wave theory, as well as published a stochastic model that could reproduce quantum field theory. Non-locality isn’t the only option. It’s just the simplest and most intuitive one where all the supposed “paradoxes” disappear in a puff of smoke when you accept that it’s just a contextual stochastic theory. However, there have been arguments made to drop other assumptions, like temporality rather than locality, based on the Two-State Vector Formalism. I am not a fan of non-temporality but I still respect such a position way better than denying objective reality even exists.

1/2

It really does not. Physics academia is just filled with crackpot mystics. I like to call them the metaphysical-physicists, the physicists who do not just immerse their mind in practical work but start talking metaphysics.

In 1964, the physicist John Bell proved that if you assume (1) that objective reality exists, (2) quantum mechanics is correct, and (3) special relativity is correct, then you run into a contradiction, and so one of the assumptions must be wrong. Deranged physicists in academia concluded #1 one is wrong and started to promote the crackpot mystical views that objective reality doesn’t actually exist. Like 90% of the quantum mysticism you see these does not originate from non-physicists like Deepak Chopra but from actual PhD physicists.

This is, at least, the story the mystics like to tell, that Bell’s theorem “proved” there is no objective reality. But this is a historical falsification, because if you actually check the historical record, you find that physicists in academia started to come to the “consensus” that objective reality isn’t real back in the 1927 Solvay conference, decades before John Bell ever published his theorem, and many more decades before it was ever confirmed in experiment, with Albert Einstein pretty much the last major holdout criticizing this turn of events, once asking Abraham Pais, “do you really believe that the moon doesn’t exist when you’re not looking at it?”

They already decided it doesn’t exist before they had any theorem or any empirical evidence that the theorem was correct. Bell’s theorem genuinely has nothing to do with this turn of events.

What is even more absurd is that we have known since the day special relativity was introduced in 1905 that it is not even necessary to make the right predictions of special relativity. Lorentz had proposed a theory in 1904 which is mathematically equivalent to special relativity without special relativity, and hence we know you can drop #3 without actually dropping the empirical predictions of #3. There is zero empirical necessity for premise #3.

Metaphysical-physicists love historical falsification. They make up this completely bologna narrative that we should accept the truth of special relativity because “it is the most tested theory in the history of physics,” but the statement is nonsensical, because it is mathematically equivalent to Lorentz’s theory. Hence, every “test” for special relativity is also a test of Lorentz’s theory.

You see this dishonest line of argumentation pushed a lot by the metaphysical-physicist crowd. They will push the most absurd metaphysics you can imagine that is entirely incoherent and when you say you don’t agree with that, they accuse you of denying the science because it is “well-tested.” But none of their crackpot metaphysics has been tested at all. There is no experiment you can conduct that proves a particle doesn’t have a definite value when you are not looking at it. This is just a delusion.

here’s even evidence for “warm” quantum processing happening within each neuron in the microtubules

No.

This is sadly pseudoscience, that only gets talked about because one smart guy endorsed it, but hardly anyone in academia actually takes it seriously. What you are talking about is called Orch OR, but Orch OR is filled with problems.

One issue is that Orch OR makes a lot of claims that are not obviously connected to one another. The reason this is is an issue is because, while they call the theory “falsifiable” because it makes testable predictions, even if the predictions are tested and it is found to make the correct prediction, that wouldn’t actually even validate the theory because there is no way to actually logically or mathematically connect that experimental validation to all of its postulates.

Orch OR has some rather bizarre premises: (1) Humans can consciously choose to believe things that cannot be mathematically proven, therefore, human consciousness must not be computable, (2) you cannot compute the outcome of a quantum experiment ahead of time, therefore there must be an physical collapse that is fundamentally not computable, (3) since both are not computable, they must be the same thing: physical collapse = consciousness, (4) therefore we should look for evidence that the brain is a quantum computer.

Argument #1 really makes no sense. Humans believing silly things doesn’t prove human decisions aren’t computable. Just look at AI. It is obviously computable and hallucinates nonsense all the time. This dubious argument means that #3 doesn’t follow; there is no good reason to think consciousness and “collapse” are related.

Argument #2 is problematic because physical collapse models are not compatible with special relativity or the statistical predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and so they cannot reproduce the predictions of quantum field theory in all cases, and so they aren’t particularly popular among physicists, and of course there is no evidence for them. Most physicists see the “collapse” as an epistemic, not a physical, event.

Orch OR also arbitrarily insists on using the Diósi–Penrose model specifically, even though there have been multiple models of physical collapse proposed, such as GRW. There is no obvious reason to use this model specifically, it isn’t connected to any of the premises in the theory. Luckily, argument #2 does present falsifiable claims, but because #2 is not logically connected to the rest of the arguments, even if we do prove that the Diósi–Penrose model is correct, it doesn’t follow that #1, #3, or #4 are correct. We would just know there are physical collapses, but nothing else in the theory would follow.

The only other argument that propose something falsifiable is #4, but again, #4 is not connected to #1, #3, or #4. Even if you desperately searched around frantically for any evidence that the brain is a quantum computer, and found some, that would just be your conclusion: the brain is a quantum computer. From that, #1, #2, and #3 do not then follow. It would just be an isolated fact in and of itself, an interesting discovery but wouldn’t validate the theory. I mean, we already have quantum computers, if you think collapse = consciousness, then you would have to already think quantum computers are conscious. A bizarre conclusion.

In fact, only #2 and #4 are falsifiable, but even if both #2 and #4 are validated, it doesn’t get you to #1 or #3, so the theory as a whole still would remain unvalidated. It is ultimately an unfalsifiable theory but with falsifiable subcomponents. The advocates insist we should focus on the subcomponents as proof it’s a scientific theory because “it’s falsifiable,” but the theory as a whole simply is not falsifiable.

Also, microtubules are structural. They don’t play any role in information processing in the brain, just in binding cells together, but it’s not just brain cells, microtubules are something found throughout your body in all kinds of cells. There is no reason to think at all they play any role in computations in the brain. The only reason you see interest in them from the Orch OR “crowd” (it’s like, what, 2 people who just so happen to be very loud?) is because they’re desperate for anything that vaguely looks like quantum effects in the brain, and so far microtubules are the only things that seem quantum effects may play some role, but this role is again structural. There is no reason to believe it plays any role in information processing or cognition.

I think a lot of proponents of objective collapse would pick a bone with that, haha, although it’s really just semantics. They are proposing extra dynamics that we don’t understand and can’t yet measure.

Any actual physicist would agree objective collapse has to modify the dynamics, because it’s unavoidable when you introduce an objective collapse model and actually look at the mathematics. No one in the physics community would debate GRW or the Diósi–Penrose model technically makes different predictions, however, and in fact the people who have proposed these models often view this as a positive thing since it makes it testable rather than just philosophy.

How the two theories would deviate would depend upon your specific objective collapse model, because they place thresholds in different locations. For GRW, it is based on a stochastic process that increases with probability over time, rather than a sharp threshold, but you still should see statistical deviations between its predictions and quantum mechanics if you can maintain a coherent quantum state for a large amount of time. The DP model has something to do with gravity, which I do not know enough to understand it, but I think the rough idea is if you have sufficient mass/energy in a particular locality it will cause a “collapse,” and so if you can conduct an experiment where that threshold of mass/energy is met, traditional quantum theory would predict the system could still be coherent whereas the DP model would reject that, and so you’d inherently end up with deviations in the predictions.

What’s the definition of interact here?

An interaction is a local event where two systems become correlated with one another as a result of the event.

“The physical process during which O measures the quantity q of the system S implies a physical interaction between O and S. In the process of this interaction, the state of O changes…A quantum description of the state of a system S exists only if some system O (considered as an observer) is actually ‘describing’ S, or, more precisely, has interacted with S…It is possible to compare different views, but the process of comparison is always a physical interaction, and all physical interactions are quantum mechanical in nature.”

The term “observer” is used very broadly in RQM and can apply to even a single particle. It is whatever physical system you are choosing as the basis of a coordinate system to describe other systems in relation to.

Does it have an arbitrary cutoff like in objective collapse?

It has a cutoff but not an arbitrary cutoff. The cutoff is in relation to whatever system participates in an interaction. If you have a system in a superposition of states, and you interact with it, then from your perspective, it is cutoff, because the system now has definite, real values in relation to you. But it does not necessarily have definite, real values in relation to some other isolated system that didn’t interact at all.

You can make a non-separable state as big as you want.

Only in relation to things not participating in the interaction. The moment something enters into participation, the states become separable. Two entangled particles are nonseparable up until you interact with them. Although, even for the two entangled particles, from their “perspectives” on each other, they are separable. It is only nonseparable from the perspective of yourself who has not interacted with them yet. If you interact with them, an additional observer who has not interacted with you or the three particles yet may still describe all three of you in a nonseparble entangled state, up until they interact with it themselves.

This is also the first I’ve heard anything about time-symmetric interpretations. That sounds pretty fascinating. Does it not have experimenter “free will”, or do they sidestep the no-go theorems some other way?

It violates the “free will” assumption because there is no physical possibility of setting up an experiment where the measurement settings cannot potentially influence the system if you take both the time-forwards and time-reverse evolution seriously. We tend to think because we place the measurement device after the initial preparation and that causality only flows in a single time direction, then it’s possible for the initial preparation to affect the measurement device but impossible for the measurement device to affect the initial preparation. But this reasoning doesn’t hold if you drop the postulate of the arrow of time, because in the time-reverse, the measurement interaction is the first interaction in the causal chain and the initial preparation is the second.

Indeed, every single Bell test, if you look at its time-reverse, is unambiguously local and easy to explain classically, because all the final measurements are brought to a single locality, so in the time-reverse, all the information needed to explain the experiment begins in a single locality and evolves towards the initial preparation. Bell tests only appear nonlocal in the time-forwards evolution, and if you discount the time-reverse as having any sort of physical reality, it then forces you to conclude it must either be nonlocal or a real state for the particles independent of observation cannot exist. But if you drop the postulate of the arrow of time, this conclusion no longer follows, although you do end up with genuine retrocausality (as opposed to superdeterminism which only gives you pseudo-retrocausality), so it’s not like it gives you a classical system.

So saying we stick with objective collapse or multiple worlds, what I mean is, could you define a non-Lipschitz continuous potential well (for example) that leads to multiple solutions to a wave equation given the same boundary?

I don’t know, but that is a very interesting question. If you figure it out, I would be interested in the answer.

Many of the interpretations of quantum mechanics are nondeterministic.

1. Relational quantum mechanics interprets particles as taking on discrete states at random whenever they interact with another particle, but only in relation to what they interact with and not in relation to anything else. That means particles don’t have absolute properties, like, if you measure its spin to be +1/2, this is not an absolute property, but a property that exists only relative to you/your measuring device. Each interaction leads to particles taking on definite states randomly according to the statistics predicted by quantum theory, but only in relation to things participating in those interactions.

2. Time-symmetric interpretations explain violations of Bell inequalities through rejecting a fundamental arrow of time. Without it, there’s no reason to evolve the state vector in a single time-direction. It thus adopts the Two-State Vector Formalism which evolves it in both directions simultaneously. When you do this, you find it places enough constructs on the particles give you absolutely deterministic values called weak values, but these weak values are not what you directly measure. What you directly measure are the “strong” values. You can interpret it such that every time two particles interact, they take on “strong” values randomly according to a rule called the Aharonov-Bergmann-Lebowitz rule. This makes time-symmetric interpretations local realist but not local deterministic, as it can explain violations of Bell inequalities through local information stored in the particles, but that local information still only statistically determines what you observe.

3. Objective collapse models are not really interpretations but new models because they can’t universally reproduce the mathematics of quantum theory, but some serious physicists have explored them as possibilities and they are also fundamentally random. You assume that particles literally spread out as waves until some threshold is met then they collapse down randomly into classical particles. The reason this can’t reproduce the mathematics of quantum theory is because this implies quantum effects cannot be scaled beyond whatever that threshold is, but no such threshold exists in traditional quantum mechanics, so such a theory must necessarily deviate from its predictions at that threshold. However, it is very hard to scale quantum effects to large scales, so if you place the threshold high enough, you can’t practically distinguish it from traditional quantum mechanics.

don’t mind me i have autism

Many worlds theories are rather strange.

If you take quantum theory at face value without trying to modifying it in any way, then you unequivocally run into the conclusion that ψ is contextual, that is to say, what ψ you assign to a system depends upon your measurement context, your “perspective” so to speak.

This is where the “Wigner’s friend paradox” arises. It’s not really a “paradox” as it really just shows ψ is contextual. If Wigner and his friend place a particle in a superposition of states, his friend says he will measure it, and then Wigner steps out of the room for a moment when he is measuring it, from the friend’s perspective he would reduce ψ to an eigenstate, whereas in Wigner’s perspective ψ would instead remain in a superposition of states but one entangled with the measuring device.

This isn’t really a contradiction because in density matrix form Wigner can apply a perspective transformation and confirm that his friend would indeed perceive an eigenstate with certain probabilities for which one they would perceive given by the Born rule, but it does illustrate the contextual nature of quantum theory.

If you just stop there, you inevitably fall into relational quantum mechanics. Relational quantum mechanics just accepts the contextual nature of ψ and tries to make sense of it within the mathematics itself. Most other “interpretations” really aren’t even interpretations but sort of try to run away from the conclusion, such as significantly modifying the mathematics and even statistical predictions in order to introduce objective collapse or hidden variables in order to either get rid of a contextual ψ or get rid of ψ as something fundamental altogether.

Many Worlds is still technically along these lines because it does add new mathematics explicitly for the purpose of avoiding the conclusion of irreducible contextuality, although it is the most subtle modification and still reproduces the same statistical predictions. If we go back to the Wigner’s friend scenario, Wigner’s friend reduced ψ relative to his own context, but Wigner, who was isolated from the friend and the particle, did not reduce ψ by instead described them as entangled.

So, any time you measure something, you can imagine introducing a third-party that isn’t physically interacting with you or the system, and from that third party’s perspective you would be in an entangled superposition of states. But what about the physical status of the third party themselves? You could introduce a fourth party that would see the system and the third party in an entangled superposition of states. But what about the fourth party? You could introduce a fifth party… so on and so forth.

You have an infinite regress until, at some how (somehow), you end up with Ψ, which is a sort of “view from nowhere,” a perspective that contains every physical object, is isolated from all those physical objects, and is itself not a physical object, so it can contain everything. So from the perspective of this big Ψ, everything always remains in a superposition of states forever, and all the little ψ are only contextual because they are like perspectival slices within Ψ.

You cannot derive Ψ mathematically because there is no way to get from inherently contextual ψ to this preferred nonphysical perspective Ψ, so you cannot know its mathematical properties. There is also no way to define it, because each ψ is an element of Hilbert space and Hilbert space is a constructed space, unlike background spaces like Minkowski space. The latter are defined independently of the objects the contain, whereas the former are defined in terms of the objects they contain. That means for two different physical systems, you will have two different ψ that will be assigned to two different Hilbert spaces. The issue is that you cannot define the Hilbert space that Ψ is part of because it would require knowing everything in the universe.

Hence, Ψ cannot be derived nor defined, so it can only be vaguely postulated, and its mathematical properties also have to be postulated as you cannot derive them from anything. It is just postulated to be this privileged cosmic perspective, a sort of godlike ethereal “view from nowhere,” and then it is postulated to have the same mathematical properties as ψ but that all ψ are also postulated to be subsystems of Ψ. You can then write things down like how a partial trace on Ψ can give you information about any perspective of its subsystems, but only because it was defined to have those properties. It is true by definition.

In a RQM perspective it just takes quantum theory at face value without bothering to introduce a Ψ and just accepts that ψ is contextual. Talking about a non-contextual (absolute) ψ makes about as much sense as talking about non-contextual (absolute) velocity, and talking about a privileged perspective in QM makes about as much sense as talking about a privileged perspective in special relativity. For some reason, people are perfectly happy with accepting the contextual nature of special relativity, but they struggle real hard with the contextual nature of quantum theory, and feel the need to modify it, to the point of convincing themselves that there is a multiverse in order to escape it.

Gravity isn’t a force. It’s the curvature of spacetime, the bending itself. You can’t compare it to the three other forces.

I do agree but, it is very common in academia to disagree with this, to believe that the geometric representation of gravity is merely a clever trick to approximate gravitational effects, but that in reality it is caused by a force-carrying particle just like any other force, a graviton, and spacetime is flat. That was the basis of String Theory and some other views. I don’t know why this view is so popular but it is.

That’s literally China’s policies. The problem is most westerners are lied to about China’s model and it is just painted it as if Deng Xiaoping was an uber capitalist lover and turned China into a free market economy and that was the end of history.

The reality is that Deng Xiaoping was a classical Marxist so he wanted China to follow the development path of classical Marxism (grasping the large, letting go of the small) and not the revision of Marxism by Stalin (nationalizing everything), because Marxian theory is about formulating a scientific theory of socioeconomic development, so if they want to develop as rapidly as possible they needed to adhere more closely to Marxian economics.

Deng also knew the people would revolt if the country remained poor for very long, so they should hyper-focus on economic development first-of-foremost at all costs for a short period of time. Such a hyper-focus on development he had foresight to predict would lead to a lot of problems: environmental degradation, rising wealth inequality, etc. So he argued that this should be a two-step development model. There would be an initial stage of rapid development, followed by a second stage of shifting to a model that has more of a focus on high quality development to tackle the problems of the previous stage once they’re a lot wealthier.

The first stage went from Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin, and then they announced they were entering the second phase under Hu Jintao and this has carried onto the Xi Jinping administration. Western media decried Xi an “abandonment of Deng” because western media is just pure propaganda when in reality this was Deng’s vision. China has switched to a model that no longer prioritizes rapid growth but prioritizes high quality growth.

One of the policies for this period has been to tackle the wealth inequality that has arisen during the first period. They have done this through various methods but one major one is huge poverty alleviation initiatives which the wealthy have been required to fund. Tencent for example “donated” an amount worth 3/4th of its whole yearly profits to government poverty alleviation initiatives. China does tax the rich but they have a system of unofficial “taxation” as well where they discretely take over a company through a combination of party cells and becoming a major shareholder with the golden share system and then make that company “donate” its profits back to the state. As a result China’s wealth inequality has been gradually falling since 2010 and they’ve become the #1 funder of green energy initiatives in the entire world.

The reason you don’t see this in western countries is because they are capitalist. Most westerners have an mindset that laws work like magic spells, you can just write down on a piece of paper whatever economic system you want and this is like casting a spell to create that system as if by magic, and so if you just craft the language perfectly to get the perfect spell then you will create the perfect system.

The Chinese understand this is not how reality works, economic systems are real physical machines that continually transform nature into goods and services for human conception, and so whatever laws you write can only meaningfully be implemented in reality if there is a physical basis for them.

The physical basis for political power ultimately rests in production relations, that is to say, ownership and control over the means of production, and thus the ability to appropriate all wealth. The wealth appropriation in countries like the USA is entirely in the hands of the capitalist class, and so they use that immense wealth, and thus political power, to capture the state and subvert it to their own interests, and thus corrupt the state to favor those very same capital interests rather than to control them.

The Chinese understand that if you want the state to remain an independent force that is not captured by the wealth appropriators, then the state must have its own material foundations. That is to say, the state must directly control its own means of production, it must have its own basis in economic production as well, so it can act as an independent economic force and not wholly dependent upon the capitalists for its material existence.

Furthermore, its economic basis must be far larger and thus more economically powerful than any other capitalist. Even if it owns some basis, if that basis is too small it would still become subverted by capitalist oligarchs. The Chinese state directly owns and controls the majority of all its largest enterprises as well as has indirect control of the majority of the minority of those large enterprises it doesn’t directly control. This makes the state itself by far the largest producer of wealth in the whole country, producing 40% of the entire GDP, no singular other enterprise in China even comes close to that.

The absolute enormous control over production allows for the state to control non-state actors and not the other way around. In a capitalist country the non-state actors, these being the wealth bourgeois class who own the large enterprises, instead captures the state and controls it for its own interests and it does not genuinely act as an independent body with its own independent interests, but only as the accumulation of the average interests of the average capitalist.

No law you write that is unfriendly to capitalists under such a system will be sustainable, and often are entirely non-enforceable, because in capitalist societies there is no material basis for them. The US is a great example of this. It’s technically illegal to do insider trading, but everyone in US Congress openly does insider trading, openly talks about it, and the records of them getting rich from insider training is pretty openly public knowledge. But nobody ever gets arrested for it because the law is not enforceable because the material basis of US society is production relations that give control of the commanding heights of the economy to the capitalist class, and so the capitalists just buy off the state for their own interests and there is no meaningfully competing power dynamic against that in US society.